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The Dynamics of Tension: 
Normative Dimensions of Religion and Politics 
CLARKE E. CocHRA 
Texas Tech University 
Government seems to me a part of religion itself, a 
thing sacred in its institution and end. For if it does not 
directly remove the cause, it crushes the effects of evil 
and it is as such (though a lower yet) an emanation of 
the same divine power that is both author and object of 
pure religion .... But that is only to evil doers, govern-
ment itself being otherwise as capable of kindness, 
goodness, and charity as a more private society. They 
weakly err that think there is no other use of govern-
ment than correction which is the coarsest part of it. 
Daily experience tells us that the care and regulation 
of many other affairs, more soft and daily necessary, 
make up much of the greatest part of government and 
[this] must have followed the peopling of the world had 
Adam never fell and [it] will continue among men, on 
earth, under the highest attainments they may arrive 
at by the coming of the blessed Second Adam, the 
Lord from Heaven. 
William Penn, Preface to the Frame 
of Government of Pennsylvania (1682)1 
Penn's rather sanguine view of government assimilates it to both 
religion and private life. Yet there is something to be said for it. 
Government does outlaw (some) sin, and it does regulate (not always 
softly) matters of food, clothing, and shelter. Government acts on the 
border of private and public life; yet it forms its own border with 
religion. I intend here to examine the dynamics of the transactions 
across these borders. These transactions at their best reflect a creative 
tension between religion and politics. 
1. General Considerations 
This tension is often misunderstood as strain between private and 
public life. Yet, I shall argue, religion is a constant reminder of the unity 
of public and private, but also of the boundary between them. Private 
and public life need each other, but they are different realms. The 
validity and the distinctive character of each contributes to a healthy 
society. Religion affirms the public/private distinction, but also the 
need to cross the boundary. 
Because religion suggests that culture is not divine (at the most, it 
is the direct will and creation of the divine), religion more directly than 
other systems of value insinuates the tension between culture and 
something higher than culture. Although religion is linked to culture 
Note: I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation for a Fellowship Research Grant and to Texas Tech 
University for a Faculty Development Leave, which supported the research and writing for this article. 
14 
and frequently coopted by it, the "higher" religions and religions with 
more reflective traditions more emphatically suggest tension with 
culture. The inherent dynamic of religion's orientation to a transcen-
dent source of being, independent of human control, opens the path 
toward cultural conflict. As much as culture takes upon itself divine 
color, it cannot hide its human roots. 
Though the tension between the divine and the mundane 
sometimes manifests itself as stress between private and public life, 
the individual person, where the competing attractions of culture and 
the sacred intersect, really is the locus of tension. 2 Machiavelli, for ex-
ample, denouncing Christianity's public effects, clearly understood 
that the strain was not between private religion (Christianity) and 
public good (the republic), but between the different public demands of 
Christianity and the republic on the individual. Machiavelli rejected 
Christianity for its cultural consequences. The unique perspective of 
religion reveals the person as a field of cross-cutting tensions between 
the divine and culture in private and public life. 
Because religion touches (sometimes unconsciously) the core ·of a 
believer's character, it bears upon the moral boundaries of public and 
private life. The role of politics in creating social peace and justice 
depends upon personal interior peace and justice. Government and 
politics can contribute to, as Penn argued, but cannot bring men and 
women to virtuous living or inner tranquility, for they cannot prescribe 
all virtuous actions or proscribe all vice. Moreover, political life cannot 
bring final beatitude. 
Although religion and public life intersect, religion fundamentally 
reminds us of the limits of politics and of the nonequivalence of politics 
and public life. In the American tradition, for example, the Bible has 
reminded us "that public spirit will always be opposed by private in-
terest," that law and coercion must supplement public virtue and par-
ticipation, and that "the larger the political society, the greater the ten-
sion between body and spirit, private feelings and public duties. " 3 We 
must remember that religion points resolutely to life beyond politics. It 
reminds us that public problems and their solutions are not entirely 
political. Indeed, the distinctive contribution of religion to public and 
private life, to individuals and to culture, is to refer them to what is 
beyond politics. 
Two (or more) forces pulling in different directions define a ten-
sion. Sometimes its stress holds things together, for example, a rubber 
band. But sometimes it causes things to break apart, as when a spring 
snaps from being wound too tightly. To understand the 
religion/ politics tension, we must define the directions in which each 
pulls. We must also show how tension between them permits each to 
work better. 
Religion brings politics to awareness of the highest, lowest, and 
most mysterious features of life, especially of the lofty and the 
mysterious . Politics, better acquainted with the lowest, brings 
religious passion and self-assurance to awareness of the middle ground 
between the highest and the lowest; that is, it teaches religion the 
necessity and the art of compromise. Moreover, some of the highest 
and lowest things are already at home in politics-honor, bravery, lust 
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for power, and the passions of blood and soil. Politics can make religion 
alert to these, and to their danger. 
Religion pulls toward the transcendent, toward principles, virtues, 
ideals, and perfection. Unrestrained by tension this religious dynamic 
produces fanaticism. Religious passion finds it difficult to compromise, 
to acknowledge how striving after perfection founders on human 
weakness. Politics, however, demands compromise, for the key fact of 
politics, especially of participatory public life, lies in confrontation with 
the ideas and the interests of others, with the mosaic of human frailty 
and plurality. 
Just as religion would avoid compromise, politics would avoid 
righteousness. Politics pulls toward the vague middle ground, toward 
indifference and cynicism. Left to itself, politics seeks the easy, 
painless way. High principles make for difficult political choices, for it 
is painful to confront higher things, to acknowledge the possibility of 
something better and to accept the discipline necessary to reach it. 
Religion in public life can teach politics about the higher things and 
stimulate, even embarrass, politicians and citizens to discover them. 
The tension produced by these conflicting natural tendencies 
defines their relationship as both competitive and cooperative. 4 The 
danger of misunderstanding the relationship between religion and 
politics comes when we forget that it must include both cooperation 
and competition. When the tension is lost, the two either fly apart or, 
worse, collapse together. The latter is the world's too frequent condi-
. tion. As Roland Robertson observes, " ... [R]eligion is being politicized 
and politics (as well as economics) is being sacralized intrasocially and 
globally." 5 The Unification Church worldwide and religion in Iran cur-
rently exemplify politicized religion; sacralized politics takes form in 
totalitarian ideologies. Both of these forms of lost tension obscure the 
border between religion and politics. These territories should remain 
distinct, but mutually interactive. 
2. What Religion Teaches Politics 
In a skeptical and relativistic age religion challenges easy moral 
relativism and indifference. As Hadley Arkes remarks, " ... [M]oral 
'relativism' has become the secular religion these days among those 
with a college education. " 6 Religion contests the cynical and egoistic 
political consequences of this relativism by advancing in public debate 
principles claiming sacred roots. 
Thus, despite the exaggerated claims and extreme lengths to 
which some religious groups have gone in policy debates, it is healthy 
for a political system (and for citizens) dangerously close to "interest 
group liberalism" to face demands for unilateral disarmament, feeding 
the hungry and taking care of the sick, full employment, action against 
cocaine, marijuana, teen pregnancy, and pornography, cessation of 
abortion, and an end to capital punishment. The debate sparked by 
religious campaigns to confront the political system with these issues is 
uncomfortable , but the debate at least revives substantive political 
issues and principles and pushes fundamental questions of justice and 
peace to the forefront of attention in a system characterized by self-
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satisfied, cynical boredom with any issues but self-interest.7 Similarly, 
instead of deploring the debate over the judicial principles and substan-
tive views of Robert Bork, President Reagan's Supreme Court 
nominee, we should welcome such debate as the true substance of 
public, political life. 
Neither politics nor political theory is to judge the truth of com-
peting religious claims. I recognize that religious groups disagree on 
matters of principle and policy and that they themselves pull in multi-
ple directions. However, even their advocacy of conflicting principle is 
vital, for genuine public life depends on matters of character and virtue 
and pertains to substantive issues over which citizens interact and con-
front each other to create a common good out of conflicting interests 
and principles. Politics must not deplore or dismiss religious competi-
tion, but rather moderate its worst passions. 
The approach to justice in the 1986 pastoral letter on the economy 
issued by the United State Catholic Conference illustrates my point. I 
do not intend to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of that state-
ment or the debate it occasioned or even to reveal my agreement or 
disagreement with its positions. The point I wish to emphasize is 
Gerald M. Mara's contention that the letter contains an account of 
justice superior to such liberal, political treatments as Rawls's, for the 
letter addresses the urgency of justice. 8 Political theorists' accounts of 
justice tend to be abstract and categorical. They supply no urgent 
motivation to act against injustice . The bishops' statement is substan-
tive and sensitive to historical conditions. Moreover, it furnishes for 
those who agree with it urgent motivation to political action. 
The bishops' theory of justice is not philosophically unchallengable. 
Yet their account of justice, like that of the Hebrew prophets, 
resonates with the passion for justice. A religious dimension advances 
in policy debate the passion for justice neglected by "neutral" theories 
and interest-group politics. Justice touches the feeling heart as well as 
the calculating head, and religion can push the public to take that fun-
damental emotion into account. 
Similarly, the radical activity of those religious groups and in-
dividuals acting outside ordinary politics-such as Gandhi, Mother 
Teresa, Dorothy Day, Mitch Snyder, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer-can 
goad formal, bureaucratic political institutions to take account of a 
higher spirit and a good greater than rules, efficiency, and the letter of 
the law.9 Sparks often fly in such encounters, just as they fly in the 
creative tension of a steel blade pressed against a sharpening stone. 
Let me advance an even more controversial example of the kind of 
contribution religion can make to politics in a liberal democratic socie-
ty, one itself in some tension with the preceding paragraph . Though 
religious groups may take obedience too far, liberal society needs 
religion's lessons in obedience. For liberalism tries to abolish obe-
dience by making the legitimacy of rules depend upon the satisfaction 
of interests. Rousseau, no liberal but here in the liberal spirit, wanted 
to find a way to make it possible in civil society to obey only oneself. 
Liberalism tends to undermine the public grounds of obedience, 
leaving it only, for example, for the private life of the family. Even in 
private life, however, increasing public requirements for procedural 
17 
rights hedge obedience. Yet, as Milgram's experiments show, a deep 
human propensity to obey authority remains even in liberal society. 10 
"Blind" obedience, frowned upon by liberal principles, goes 
underground and emerges in strange places, not least of which being 
cultic forms of religion, such as that of the Reverend Jim Jones, and 
claims of obedience to demons in cases of strange, often violent 
behavior. Though I realize that these brief illustrations do not con-
stitute proof, traditional Western religions could perform a public ser-
vice in reemphasizing discipline and obedience with respect to 
religious principles, rules, rituals, and behavior. Bringing obedience 
above ground makes it more likely to find appropriate outlets. 
If it enters policy debates on politics' terms, religion gives up its 
claim to uniqueness, becoming one more interest group trapped within 
the limited alternatives offered by modern ideologies. To accept these 
alternatives would be to resolve the tension between religion and 
politics by surrender. It would abandon the cold, lonely marches on 
religion's border with politics for the warmth of the political capitol. I 
contend, on the other hand, that religion must maintain its claim to a 
truth higher than politics. This perspective does not mean that politics 
can or should judge that truth, only that religious claims should force 
politics to a higher level than it otherwise would discover. Its truth 
claims do not relegate religion to the private sphere. The proper 
ground of these claims is the public/private border, not the heartland 
of private or of public life. 
This argument suggests that religious persons should approach 
politics from their particular faith perspectives, from their own truth-
claims. Politics will water-down those claims sufficiently without 
religious groups themselves attempting to find a lowest common 
denominator set of religious or moral beliefs. Religious groups become 
properly political and place the necessary pressure on politics when 
they advocate their distinctive principles on matters of public concern 
(this latter phrase is vital) and when they live faithfully their distinctive 
beliefs about the transpolitical. 11 
Religions should not promote all of their beliefs in political debate. 
Doing so confuses the territory of religion with that of politics. Rather, 
those religious beliefs and principles that most touch public concerns, 
for example, justice, freedom, respect for life, peace, the place of sin, 
death, and the meaning of human sociability, should enter political 
debate in order to draw politics beyond the level where it otherwise 
would settle. Privatization of religion is dangerous, because it allows 
politics itself to become privatized and self-absorbed. As George Arm-
strong Kelly observes, "If privatization has pushed religion out of the 
public sphere, it is currently turning politics into an I-Thou relationship 
or a sphere of indifference." 12 Reduced to administration and interests, 
politics becomes as secularized and squeezed of meaning as private 
religion. Politics without high principles is a dull but dangerous 
business for anyone not driven by consuming ambition, greed, or need 
for recognition. 
3. What Politics Teaches Religion 
But religion without politics is also dangerous. I have alluded 
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previously to religious fanaticism. Messianism without a messiah 
sweeps all principle before it. Religious persons often divide the world 
into two camps, fellow believers and those outside the faith. Toward 
the former the appropriate attitude is familiarity and community, in-
cluding both affectionate feelings and (at times) discipline. Attitudes 
toward the latter, however, include attempted conversion, conquest 
and enslavement, and withdrawal. Relationships with outsiders 
governed solely by their lack of faith allow no public bond between 
believers and non-believers. What remains are only the deadly, 
dichotomous categorizations: us and them, believers and heathens, 
friends and enemies. 
Public life creates other possibilities. The first is "stranger. " 13 The 
fellow believer is known as one of the group, and the heathen is known 
through stereotypes. The stranger, however, is mysterious and 
unknown. He may be one of us or one of them, a potential friend or 
enemy. Or, the most radical possibility of all, he may just be himself, 
different from us, but related none the less. Public life, especially in the 
form of politics, requires interaction with strangers. For politics is full 
of strangers, people with ideas, customs, interests, emotions, and 
beliefs different from, and sometimes at odds with, our own. Entry into 
a political relationship with strangers dispels some mystery, but does 
not eliminate it. Strangers still remain different. Nevertheless, politics 
opens a middle camp between friends and enemies, and, because both 
friends and enemies trade with that camp, the world seems less black 
and white, the grounds of fanaticism less solid. 
Indeed, politics requires everyone to spend some time among 
strangers and to discover their own strangeness. Politics is self-
discovery as well as self-display. Believers who enter politics enter the 
strangers' camp and discover things about strangers and about 
themselves that alter their frame of reference and call for less single-
mindedness, for more tolerance and civility. Ultimately, believers 
might even learn that they are strangers to themselves and that God is 
also a stranger, for the God completely known does not transcend 
human control. Politics can teach religion humility and the tolerance 
that is humility's natural partner. It may teach the believer the limits of 
his belief. 14 
Politics can teach religion how to live with pluralism. As religion 
can reconcile politics to mysterious forces beyond its control, so 
politics can reconcile religion to facticity, to the hard places against 
which the tide of religion crashes . Religious ideals meet recalcitrant 
political reality and the strangers who live there. The principles, 
values, excellences, and virtues of religious life cannot suffuse public 
or private life with the wave of a wand or a word of blessing. Use of 
coercion is always a temptation for frustrated virtue, a temptation to 
which even the most perceptive (witness Augustine) can succumb. In 
authoritarian, totalitarian, or oligarchic regimes, use of coercion finds 
ready justification. A political regime, however, supports resistance to 
imposed religious ideals, blunts the weapon of coercion, and teaches 
religion other methods for dissemination of belief. As William Penn 
suggested in the headnote, coercion is the coarsest part of government; 
so political regimes restrict its availability. 
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When politics involves the encounter of strangers on a common 
ground where they must interact peaceably, it learns compromise. 
Compromise is a lesson religion too must learn, though it does not like 
the name and tries to find synonyms, like "prudence" or "pastoral 
solutions." The full excellence of religious ideals is seldom achieved. 
As J. Budziszewski argues, " ... Real excellence is apt to be a rare 
item, more like leaven than like flour. Cultivating the excellences will 
always be of the first importance, but we should also be prepared to 
curb and channel the flows and eruptions of passion. " 15 Compromise is 
one way, a distinctively political way, of resolving the tensions be-
tween religious ideals and recalcitrant facts . 
This role for politics allows religion to be religion; it allows all 
religions to advance their views strongly. Religion entering politics 
should not be wishy-washy. But politics and the necessity of com-
promise force religious groups to recognize the plurality of the political 
world, especially the plurality of religious groups strongly advancing 
distinctive views. The point is not for religious groups to compromise 
their principles in order to enter the fray, but for politics to force com-
promise at the level of policy.16 When religious groups recognize and 
acknowledge both politics as a form of public life and the recalcitrant 
facticity of political life, they can begin, not to change their principles, 
but to find ways of applying them to policy that are acceptable to other 
citizens . They can begin to learn political civility, tolerance, and the art 
of compromise. Observe the course of the Reverend Jerry Falwell in 
moderating his policy proposals on abortion and other agenda items of 
the New Religious Right from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. 
In the previous section I used the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter 
on the economy to illustrate the contribution religion can make to 
politics in introducing high conceptions of justice into political debate. 
Let me use the same example to illustrate what political life can teach 
religion. The bishops' letter is particularly vulnerable to criticism in 
light of the social and economic realities of modern, post-industrial 
society. The pastoral letter does not address these realities creatively, 
nor does it reflect the limitations of social and economic resources for 
realizing the principles of justice.17 The passionate concern for justice 
that is the bishops' special contribution must meet the social realities 
that are politics' special concern. Both are necessary for creative 
policy-making. 
There are two fundamental dangers of public religion: religious 
domination of public life and the affiliation of religion with political 
ideology. Both dangers stem from religious passion. The first occurs 
when religion is able to use government as a means for realizing its vi-
sion. The second occurs when religious passion is coopted (often will-
ingly) by a political ideology and used for the ideology's ends. 
The realities of participatory politics moderate the proclivity of 
government and political ideology to inflame or coopt, and sometimes 
to be coopted by, religious passion. First, politics tames religious pas-
sion for reasons suggested above. Passion must put on decorous 
clothes to appear in public. Moreover, religious passion encounters the 
seawall of interest-group reality and of counter passions in other 
religious and non-religious groups. The garb of moderation and the 
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confrontation with other interests and passions means that religious 
passions must actually become moderate or, more precisely, seek more 
moderate, tame expression and more limited goals. The realities of 
pluralism make it less likely that government or ideologies will be able 
to enflame religious fervor or to be coopted by such emotions more 
than temporarily. 18 There are too many influences on the state for 
religion to dominate more than briefly. 
This is as it should be. Religion should expect to be only one voice 
(though actually itself many) in political life. It can help to move policy 
in certain directions, but it cannot expect to determine the outcome of 
political debate. 
One unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of the political 
taming of religion is that both good and bad religious passions are 
tempered. Politics is, in this sense, indiscriminate. Given politics' 
haphazard effect, what counts is the character of citizens. Ultimately, 
the people must separate the wheat from the chaff of religious ideals 
and passions. 
There is no guarantee of popular virtue, but preservation of the 
good and discarding the bad finally depends upon it. The mechanisms 
of public life cannot make such judgments, but only furnish the space, 
time, and civility needed for character to work. The many political 
devices for channeling passion known to the ancients and moderns are 
prone to fail, to lose sight of excellence. 19 Compromise itself cannot be 
a final ideal, for compromises must be judged better and worse. We 
come full circle from what politics teaches religion to what religion 
teaches politics. Religious vision can help to judge and call to account 
political compromise, keeping the aspiration toward excellence before 
citizen attention. 
4. Conclusions 
It seems to follow that, if religion is public in the ways I have 
specified and if it makes the political contributions I have described, 
then it should be admitted to political life on precisely the same terms 
as other groups. Yet an important consideration militates against this 
simple conclusion. Religion is fundamentally private as well as public. 
Religion is a distinct realm from politics. Inviting it too far into political 
territory runs the many risks of politicized religion and chances dilu-
tion of its distinctive qualities. 
Religion should not be excluded from politics, but kept at arm's 
length. The relationship between religion and politics should imitate 
that of partners in a dance of approach and flight, a ballet expressing 
the tension between attraction and repulsion. Neither partner must 
dominate, if the dance is to continue. Religion and politics challenge 
and test each other; that is their special dynamic. 
Let me return to the metaphor of the border. What is vital is that 
religion and politics meet, not in the center of each other's territory, 
but at the border. This leaves sufficient mystery for mutual attraction. 
Religion beckons from the periphery for politics to come seek its 
ideals; politics cajoles religion to shed its unrealistic ideals and 
recognize the goods of plurality, civility, and tolerance. Such transac-
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tions across the border also produce just enough knowledge for mutual 
repulsion . Religion knows well the temptations of power. 20 Politics 
recognizes the fanaticism of religion and flees it. 
Religion exists on a double border: the boundary between private 
and public life and the boundary with politics. Life on the border is 
never easy, but religion should remain there. To confront politics 
wholeheartedly, though not to enter it fully, constitutes its political 
mission. To abandon either private or public life is to betray its 
essence. 
The lines of influence between religion and politics do not run one 
way. Politics, and culture generally, shapes religion as much as religion 
shapes politics. Not every political influence on religion is beneficial. 
Evidently , religion can learn the worst aspects of politics as well as the 
best. The point is that the debate about religion and politics, and the 
speculations of political theorists, have neglected the positive in-
fluences in each direction, the creative tensions characterizing this en-
counter. 
FOOT OTES 
•Quoted in Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday Image , 1975), Vol. 1, p. 166. 
2The perspective of this paragraph was suggested by H. Richard Niebuhr's discus-
sion of the tension between Christ and culture, Christ and Culture (New York : Harper 
Colophon, 1975), esp. Ch. 1. 
3Wilson Carey McWilliams, "The Bible in the American Political Tradition ," in 
Political AnthroPology, III: Religion and Politics, ed . by Myron J. Aronoff (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 1984). p. 19. 
•George Armstrong Kelly, Politics and Religious Consciousness in America (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction , 1984) pp. 1-2 and passim. 
5Roland Robertson, "Church-State Relations and the World System ," in Church-
State Relations: Tensions and Transitions, ed. by Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson 
(New Brunswick , NJ: Transaction, 1987), p. 50. 
6Hadley Arkes , First Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1986), p. 5. 
71 do not contend that religious groups alone keep substantive, principled issues 
before the public. Nor do I contend that religious groups are the most important actors in 
this respect. Rather, my point is that religion can and should contribute by pushing 
politics to confront such principled issues , even though a democratic politics oriented 
toward compromise finds them disturbing . 
8United States Catholic Conference, Economic justice for All : Pastoral Letter on 
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Washington : United States Catholic Con-
ference, 1986). Gerald M. Mara, "Poverty and Justice : The Bishops and Contemporary 
Liberalism," in The Deeper Meaning of Economic Life: Critical Essays on the U.S. Catholic 
Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the Economy, ed. by R. Bruce Douglass (Washington : 
Georgetown University Press, 1986), pp. 157-178. 
9See Glenn Tinder , "Christianity and the Welfare State," unpublished paper. To 
say this is not, of course, to endorse Fawn Hall's theory of action outside the law. 
•
0Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York : Harper, 1974). 
11This perspective is similar to that advanced by Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of 
Character (Notre Dame: of University Notre Dame Press, 1981) and A Peaceable Kingdom 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). David Walsh makes similar points 
in "The Role of the Church in the Modern World ," Journal of Church and State, 29 
(Winter 1987), pp. 63-77. 
12Kelly, Politics, p. 186. 
13On public life as the realm of strangers and its significance for religion, see Parker 
J . Palmer, The Company of Strangers: Christians and the Renewal of America's Public Life 
(New York: Crossroads , 1981). 
1
'0n God as stranger, see Palmer, Company of Strangers. I do not argue that humility 
and moderation are learned only in politics, but that in regimes with a genuine public and 
political life politics is a readily available teacher . 
15J. Budziszewski, The Resurrection of Nature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1986), p. 153. 
16With respect to the idea of politics welcoming the sharp advocacy of religious 
22 
views, I am indebted to the remarks of Senator John Danforth and Representative Lindy 
Boggs during an interreligious forum on religion and politics at St. Alban's Church, 
Washington, DC, March 17, 1987. 
17For criticism along these lines, see Henry Briefs, "The Limits of Scripture: 
Theological Imperatives and Economic Reality," in Deeper Meaning of Economic Life, ed. 
Douglas, pp. 57-96. 
18These points are difficult to prove conclusively, but the actual political behavior of 
American religion suggests their truth. Religious groups rise and fall in influence, and 
the virulence of their expression wanes as it breaks against the hard rock of competing 
interests and the labyrinthine ways of law-making. 
19See Budziszewski's account of these devices in Resurrection, Chap. 5. 
20The temptations of Christ, especially the third, are instructive in this respect. See 
Matthew 4:1-11. (In Luke 4:1-13 the most political temptation is the second.) 
23 
